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ABSTRACT
With the rising complexity and size of hardware designs, saving development time and
cost by employing third-party intellectual property (IP) into various first-party designs has become
a necessity. However, using third-party IPs introduces the risk of adding malicious behavior to the
design, including hardware Trojans. Different from software Trojan detection, the detection of
hardware Trojans in an efficient and cost-effective manner is an ongoing area of study and has
significant complexities depending on the development stage where Trojan detection is leveraged.
Therefore, this thesis research proposes improvements to various components of the soft IP
analysis methodology utilized by the Structural Checking Tool. The Structural Checking Tool
analyzes the register-transfer level (RTL) code of IPs to determine their functionalities and to
detect and identify hardware Trojans inserted. The Structural Checking process entails parsing a
design to yield a structural representation and assigning assets that encompass 12 different
characteristics to the primary ports and internal signals. With coarse-grained asset reassignment
based on external and internal signal connections, matching can be performed against trusted IPs
to classify the functionality of an unknown soft IP. Further analysis is done using a Golden
Reference Library (GRL) containing information about known Trojan-free and Trojan-infested
designs and serves as a vital component for unknown soft IP comparison. Following functional
identification, the unknown soft IP is run through a fine-grained reassignment strategy to ensure
usage of up-to-date GRL assets, and then the matching process is used to determine whether said
IP is Trojan-infested or Trojan-free. This necessitates a large GRL while maintaining a balance of
computational resources and high accuracy to ensure effective matching.
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INTRODUCTION

As use of integrated circuits (ICs) becomes more pervasive in all areas of industry and
government, it is critical to develop hardware in a timely, cost-effective manner. Stemming from
this, third-party hardware intellectual property (IP) is needed to reduce development cost and time
due to it being impractical to design every component of an IC in house. These third-party IPs may
not always be trustworthy and may comprise hardware Trojans. A hardware Trojan is defined as
malicious, intentional modifications to a circuit to perform behavior such as leaking sensitive data,
performing a denial-of-service attack, or causing other undesired behaviors. If even a single IP
component of an IC is compromised, the integrity of the entire IC is compromised as well.
Currently, there are many approaches proposed for detecting hardware Trojans. These can
typically be distinguished by when they are used for Trojan detection. Techniques may target
hardware Trojans after production of an IP, after synthesis of an IP, or before synthesis of an IP.
For post-production IPs, detection methods focus on side-channel analysis and may use a separate
chip to detect hardware Trojans from the resultant IP. One application of side-channel analysis is
to examine the power metrics of an IP to detect whether it is Trojan-infested. This particular
approach is accomplished using a model containing Trojan-free IP power metrics for comparison
[1]. Using this technique, the authors are able to differentiate between Trojan-free and Trojaninfested ICs with 100% accuracy. However, this does have drawbacks incurred by requiring a
reference library with a large amount of data to cover a variety of ICs. Another method of hardware
Trojan detection using side-channel analysis is presented in [2]. In this variant of side-channel
analysis, no golden models are needed, and a support vector machine (SVM) is used to determine
the presence of a hardware Trojan. This approach sacrifices accuracy but retains a Trojan detection
rate of up to 93% and a classification accuracy of 91.85%. Side channel analysis can also be
1

performed using current draw. The authors of [2] define a current-related metric called
“consistency,” and experiments show the consistency measurement is markedly different in a
Trojan-infested IC, allowing their detection algorithm to effectively identify ICs infested with
Trojans. With the aforementioned techniques requiring a post-production IP, significant cost is
incurred in performing Trojan detection, leading to tradeoffs between accuracy, monetary costs,
and the time taken to get through analysis.
Another option for Trojan detection is to perform analysis post-synthesis. After the
synthesis of an IP, various structures such as netlists and other descriptors can be leveraged for
hardware Trojan detection. The authors in [4] conducted post-synthesis examination using netlists.
An SVM is used to analyze a netlist to detect three types of hardware Trojans. However, the
proposed method was not tested on Trojans without trigger circuits. Additionally, the paper
demonstrated a true negative rate of 70%. A true negative refers to successfully ignoring
acceptable behavior. Another example of netlist usage is described in [5], where the authors used
netlists in conjunction with a neural network to detect hardware Trojans within a gate-level netlist.
Results show an average true positive rate of 72.9% with an average true negative rate of 90%.
The true positive rate refers to when hardware Trojans are correctly categorized by the method.
The authors of [6] posed several techniques and tools utilizing post-synthesis methods based on
Boolean function analysis as well as graph neighborhood analysis to perform gate-level Trojan
detection. These two methods are combined into their ANGEL (Analyzing the Neighborhood of
Graphs to Expose Leakers) analysis technique to yield a false positive rate of between 30 to 40
percent. The authors note the challenge of finding a proper threshold value to use with the ANGEL
analysis technique without an automated way to determine such a value. Regarding these postsynthesis detection processes, a lesser penalty of speed is taken for some penalty to accuracy.

2

Evaluated against the other two sets of methods, this method acts as a middle ground between
maximizing either speed or accuracy.
There are pre-synthesis methods to analyze register-transfer-level (RTL) code for hardware
Trojans and to convert RTL code into other representations to aid in hardware Trojan detection.
An approach described in [7] used RTL code to generate and analyze electromagnetic signatures
to detect hardware Trojan types with an accuracy nearing 83%. However, this method may face
issues with clock variance due to the hardware Trojan detection method operating within the
frequency domain of electromagnetic side-channel radiation. The authors in [8] detailed a
technique utilizing machine learning to detect hardware Trojans in RTL code. According to the
authors, all Trojan benchmarks were completed without false positive detection on a non-Trojan
benchmark. These Trojan benchmarks consisted of nine different Trojans contained across nine
variants of RS232 RTL code as well as a normal RS232 with no Trojans. While their results were
promising, the method employed relies on other processes to aid it at different abstraction levels.
Similar to the procedures used on soft IPs above, Golden Reference Matching methods
described in [9] and [10] focus entirely on RTL code analysis rather than netlists, intermediate
representations, or post-production IPs. The techniques in [10] build upon those described in [9]
to form the overall matching system. Golden Reference Matching operates by analyzing RTL code
to extract any component and its primary ports as well as internal signals. These ports and signals
are then labeled with assets to describe their functionality in the IP and compared against a Golden
Reference Library (GRL). The GRL is a collection of both Trojan-free and Trojan-infested entries
with pre-assigned functionalities. The unknown IP being matched against the GRL is compared
with each GRL entry to evaluate the entries it most closely resembles. If the unknown IP’s best
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match is a Trojan-free entry, then it is likely to be Trojan-free. Similarly, if the IP best matches a
Trojan-infested entry, then the IP has a higher likelihood of containing a Trojan.
Building upon the methods described in [9], the first step of the matching process in [10]
is to utilize a new concept called the Champion GRL. The Champion GRL consists of manually
selected designs that are considered to be the most representative of their associated functionality.
This means there is a single design associated with each functionality. These champion entries are
used to make an initial match to assign a functionality to the unknown soft IP. Included in the
Champion GRL are 10 assets used to increase functional matching percentage for the unknown IP.
Then, the unknown IP must be compared against the Functionality GRL entries to determine the
functionality it best matches. This vastly decreases computational time as the overall GRL size
increases since only a single functionality match is required using this two-step process.
This thesis describes accomplished work and changes added to the preceding version of
the matching algorithm along with changes to the parsing stage and GRL format. Section 2
explains background information concerning the tool such as internal and external assets, structural
checking, and the Golden Reference Matching process and accompanying GRL. Section 3
proposes additions to the existing tool and subsequent implementation. This includes updates to
Hardware Description Language (HDL) RTL parsing, HDL RTL internal representation, GRL file
format, and optimizations made to the Golden Reference Matching process. Section 4 validates
the efficacy of these changes and demonstrates results and improvements, including increased
matching effectiveness. Finally, Section 5 details future work and potential changes with the new
Structural Checking Tool configuration.

4

2
2.1

BACKGROUND

ASSETS
To help describe functionality and label primary ports and internal signals, assets are

assigned to signals. These labels are crucial to the Golden Reference Matching process, explained
in Section 2.2, and describe the purpose and functionality of the signal in the unknown IP. Multiple
assets may be assigned to a signal depending on whether more than one asset is needed to capture
a signal’s functionality. Within the Structural Checking tool, internal and external assets are the
fundamental asset categories. Internal assets can further be defined as automatically assigned or
manually assigned.
2.1.1 Internal Assets
The authors in [11] and [12] describe the original work detailing initial definition and use
of internal assets. Internal assets primarily describe the workings of internal signals but may also
be applied to primary ports signals. Internal assets can be further distinguished as manually
assignable and automatically assigned assets. Automatically assigned internal assets are used to
describe different HDL code structures and the signals within them. These HDL structures include
process statements, conditional expressions, concurrent expressions, sequential expressions,
procedure statements, functions, generate statements, and constant values. Each of these types of
internal assets are called automatically assigned since they are not manually assigned by a user
and are instead assigned during the parsing step of the Structural Checking Tool. Currently, the
manually assignable internal assets remain unchanged from the aforementioned original works.

5

2.1.2 External Assets
The original work in [11] and [12] also details the basic external asset system and initial
external asset definitions. These external assets are divided into Data, Timing, System Control,
Specific System Control, and Miscellaneous. These categories as well as several example assets
are show in Table 1. External assets are assigned to primary ports and internal signals to describe
the use of signals in an unknown IP.
Table 1. External Asset Categories and Example Assets
External Asset Category
Data
Timing
System Control
Specific System Control
Miscellaneous

Example Assets
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL, DATA_MEMORY,
DATA_PERIPHERAL
STATUS, SYSTEM_TIMING, COUNT
RESET, ENABLE, INSTRUCTION
MEMORY_OP, REGISTER_FILE_CONTROL,
BUS_CONTROL
CRITICAL, KEY, DUTY_CYCLE

Each category has varying numbers of assets relating to different kinds of signal usages.
The Data category contains assets relating to the transfer of data such as computational data or
memory data. Assets in the Timing category pertain to signals used for anything related to timing
including assets for counters and delays. For System Control, all assets within are related to more
broad control of systems. In contrast to these assets, Specific System Control contains those assets
that are for specific control of systems and typically apply to only one type of system. The final
category, Miscellaneous, is used to hold several assets that do not properly fit into other categories
in addition to a few assets used as default values for various internal usages. Some internal usage
assets from this category include UNUSED and UNKNOWN while other assets like KEY and
REGISTER may be assigned to signals.
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2.1.3 Asset Filtering
Asset filtering is detailed in [9] and pertains to propagating assets assigned to a signal, all
connected signals, and any ancestors or descendants. With propagation, the tool obtains a better
understanding of the correlation between signals and can detect conflicting asset assignments or
evaluate if a suspicious asset has been propagated through to areas where it should not be used.
External assets assigned to primary circuit inputs propagate through the entire circuit and onto
their descendant primary circuit outputs. Additionally, the reverse is also true, so external assets
assigned to primary circuit outputs propagate backwards to primary inputs.
2.2

GOLDEN REFERENCE MATCHING
The authors of [9] define Golden Reference Matching as the process of matching an

unknown IP by comparing it against a GRL containing a mix of Trojan-free and Trojan-infested
IPs. By conducting this matching process, it is determined whether the unknown IP contains
Trojans. For each entry contained in the GRL, a percentage match is calculated between the entry
and the unknown IP based on measures of asset similarity. Using the highest percentage match,
Golden Reference Matching yields a probabilistic result based on the general functionality of the
unknown IP as well as indicating presence or absence of Trojans.
2.2.1 Basic Matching
Basic matching stems from calculating a percentage match of the asset characteristics
between the asset sets of an unknown soft IP and GRL entries. By comparing individual assets
within an asset set, a percentage match for the given characteristic can be calculated. Averaging
the percentage match of all characteristics allows a determination of the overall percent match for
a particular characteristic. After comparing all characteristics, the six percentage matches are
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averaged to surmise an overall match for the unknown soft IP. As an exception, there are cases
where an unknown IP or a GRL entry may not have assets in each characteristic. In this instance,
the empty characteristics are not included in the overall percentage match calculation.
2.2.2 Partial Matching
Originally introduced to the Structural Checking Tool by the authors of [9], partial
matching is utilized when assets are not perfectly identical but share a similar purpose within a
soft IP. Furthermore, basic matching provides a partial match if an asset contained in the unknown
IP or a GRL entry is a generic asset while the other is specific. When this applies, a 50% match is
assigned to the two assets. One possible example of a 50% match between related assets could be
a match between DATA_SENSITIVE and DATA_MEMORY. This happens as a result of
DATA_MEMORY being a less specific form of DATA_SENSITIVE.
2.2.3 Asset Reassignment
Introduced in [14], asset reassignment is the process by which a specific asset is changed
into a more general asset. The idea of asset reassignment originates from the previous subsection
when a more specific asset may be matched to a generic counterpart. If two signals are theoretically
the same but differ due to changes in assets introduced over time, a generic asset can be given to
the signals instead. Given that these two assets are in the same category when comparing a specific
and general asset, the specific asset is reassigned to the general asset to increase the matching
percentage. Examples of this include the DATA_COMPUTATIONAL and DATA_SENSITIVE
assets. Both of these assets are data category assets. In this case, DATA_COMPUTATIONAL can
be reassigned to DATA_SENSITIVE to increase the matching percentage from 50% to 100%.
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2.2.4 Statistical Matching
Also presented by the authors of [14], statistical matching adds various statistical formula
to aid the matching process. Frequently used assets included within a single characteristic of many
GRL entries should be treated as having a lower weight compared to assets found in a small subset
of GRL entries because the less common assets contribute more to the identifiability of a GRL
entry. Using this technique, an average asset weight can be evaluated based on the sum of all
matched asset weights divided by the total number of matched assets of a particular characteristic.

𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 =

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
∗ 100
∑𝐹𝑖=𝐴 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

Equation 1. Characteristic Weight Calculation [10]
Equation 1 shows the average asset weight calculation of a particular characteristic. After
determining the average asset weight for a single characteristic, it is divided by the sum of all
characteristics’ average asset weights and converted into a percentage based upon the sum of all
six characteristics’ average asset weight in the GRL.
2.2.5 Golden Reference Library
The GRL is a collection of soft IPs retrieved from both Trust-Hub [15, 16] and OpenCores
[17]. A general functionality is associated with each design file to label the overall function of the
soft IP, and the tool also generates an asset pattern for the known IP. Entries are manually labeled
with a functionality describing whether they are Trojan-free or Trojan-infested. These designs are
well-documented, so there is confidence concerning the design functionality.
2.2.6 Champion Golden Reference Library
Introduced by the authors of [10] to reduce the computational complexity of establishing
the functionality of an unknown IP, each GRL entry is manually inspected to copy specific entries
9

into a separate GRL. Both the Champion Golden Reference Library and the Functionality Golden
Reference Library discussed further in Section 2.2.7 supersede the Golden Reference Library
discussed in Section 2.2.5. Any entry containing too few asset sets or insufficient asset set variety
will introduce bias during the asset reassignment process. To remedy this, the manual inspection
process is employed, so one GRL entry is chosen as the most representative of a specific
functionality based on the analysis of its asset sets, asset variety, and asset makeup.
2.2.6.1 Coarse-Grained Asset Reassignment
Due to entry limitations and decreased entry count of the Champion GRL, a coarse-grained
asset reassignment approach is necessary. Since a fine-grained comparison of the unknown IP and
the Champion GRL entries is implemented, the top Champion GRL matches will have a lower
overall matching percentage with the unknown IP when they are compared against a design with
identical functionality. To address this, matching with the Champion GRL is aided by usage of
coarse-grained matching similar to asset reassignment but only applied to external characteristics.
2.2.7 Functionality Golden Reference Library
To supplement the Champion GRL, a Functionality GRL is introduced by the authors of
[10]. The introduction of the Champion GRL obsoleted the original GRL and its concepts.
Therefore, the Functionality GRL is partitioned according to functionality, so the resource cost of
matching is reduced by only matching to a specific category established by the Champion GRL
Matching process. Consequently, the GRL process breaks down into a two-step process where an
unknown IP will first have its functionality determined by its Champion GRL match and is then
further compared against the Functionality GRL entries pertaining to the chosen functionality.
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2.2.7.1 Fine-Grained Asset Reassignment
For GRL entry matching, fine-grained asset reassignment was added to increase the
matching percentage between an unknown soft IP and the Functionality GRL entries. In this type
of asset reassignment, only Functionality GRL designs are assigned. Any unknown IP used will
have its most recently assigned assets while the Functionality GRL entries may not be as up-todate, negatively affecting matching results. During asset reassignment using a specific
characteristic from the Functionality GRL, the same characteristic of the unknown IP is also used.
Initially, all asset sets from a single characteristic are considered alongside external characteristics
since most internal assets are automatically assigned. Next, each Functionality GRL entry receives
the asset sets from the same characteristic as the unknown IP, and assets from the Functionality
GRL are compared against those of the unknown IP. Since the most recent and accurate assets are
assigned to the unknown IP, this reassignment only happens for assets within the Functionality
GRL. If two particular assets from the unknown IP and Functionality GRL entry are the same, then
asset reassignment is unnecessary.

11

3

METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

While the matching process described in Section 2 is a starting point, there are further
issues to be addressed. These include optimizing the content of asset sets, defining new assets to
help describe functionalities, and improving computational efficiency of the matching and related
processes. In rebuilding several sections of the Structural Checking Tool, the parser was modified
to use the hdlConvertor Python library. This allows for conversion of RTL code into an abstract
syntax tree (AST). Additionally, the internal representation of parsed RTL code from a soft IP has
been reworked, so each design can be represented as a directed graph where the direction of node
edges is based on driving and driven signals within the RTL code. As a byproduct of directed
graph representation, other processes, like asset propagation, are made simpler by being tied to
ancestor and descendant nodes. These processes can also utilize the directed nature of the graph to
further convey the logic flow of the IP from the primary inputs to the primary outputs.
Complementing these changes, the formatting and information contained within GRL entry files
were upgraded to effectively detail GRL entries.
3.1

HDL RTL PARSING
To begin the process of converting RTL code into a directed graph representation,

hdlConvertor is employed to translate the RTL code into a descriptive AST. In addition to the AST
representation, hdlConvertor also supports a larger group of syntax of HDL languages, allowing
improved code coverage. To manipulate the AST provided by hdlConvertor, several builder
classes are utilized to traverse the tree and extract the desired information for directed graph
construction.

12

3.1.1 Composed Graph Builder
The construction of the directed graph begins and ends in this phase of the building process.
The Composed Graph Builder is first given the file path of the top-level HDL file of a soft IP.
Afterwards, the directory of the file is set as the top-level directory (TLD), so all HDL files located
within are considered a design. In this instance, the top-level HDL file contains the top-level
component for a given design. Once the top-level file and TLD are located, the top-level HDL
code is parsed to find the top-level component. After this component is found, regular expressions
are used to reduce computational time in finding declared components within each HDL file in the
TLD. While the Composed Graph Builder iterates over these HDL files, a cache of known
components is built to include component locations. Additionally, a signal graph is created and
cached along with a cache of user-defined packages to contain important definitions used
throughout the design. After the construction of both caches, it is possible to establish all
subcomponents based on the body of the top-level HDL file. To maintain a hierarchy for internal
representation of the IP, a tree structure links components as parent-child relationships using the
Component Tree Builder. Finally, after all caches are built and the component hierarchy is founded
with the Component Tree Builder, the signal graphs built for each component are combined to
form the final representation of the soft IP as a directed graph. The component cache contains a
signal graph for each component to prevent the computationally expensive process of using
hdlConvertor on any given component more than once.
3.1.2 Component Tree Builder
The Component Tree Builder is used to understand the hierarchy and composition of the
overall design based on parent-child relationships between components and subcomponents. This
builder traverses the relevant component HDL files while maintaining a cache of parsed
13

hdlContext objects given by hdlConvertor to avoid redundant parsing. Furthermore, this builder
recursively calls itself for each subcomponent. These calls then branch to all descendant
components until the entire design hierarchy is established. After determining this hierarchy, each
node in the constructed component tree is given an instance designator to allow tracking of
component instantiations. Using this information, functionally-identical components can be
differentiated from one another.
3.1.3 Signal Graph Builder
This builder class is the chief component in constructing the directed graph from the RTL
code. It is used in conjunction with the builders detailed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 to achieve
maximal accuracy in a hierarchical manner. The Signal Graph Builder traverses all relevant objects
in the AST and constructs a graph such that each signal is a node, and edges are drawn based on
the driving-driven relationship contained in the HDL code. In addition to serving this purpose, the
Signal Graph Builder automatically assigns relevant internal assets to ensure accurate description
of various HDL statements and signal usage. In every signal graph, statement hierarchies are
defined to ensure conditional driving statements or statements with driving signal lists have their
driving-driven relationships propagated throughout any nested code blocks. For example, an if
statement wrapping a for loop would lead to the interior for loop being driven by the exterior if
statement. This statement hierarchy ensures all connections are formed to show the proper flow of
logic throughout various HDL statement types. In addition to statement representations, HDL
functions and procedures are also parsed. Internally, these functions and procedures are
represented as independent signal graphs and later composed into the signal graphs of their parent
components. When composing a function graph into a component’s signal graph, a unique
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designator is assigned to function signals to ensure they are uniquely identifiable based on the
number of function calls within the component.
3.2

GRAPH REPRESENTATION
RTL designs are parsed and converted into a directed graph. This graph is used to convey

all connections between signals while highlighting the flow of logic throughout a design.
Understanding the logic flow assists with asset propagation to ancestor and descendant nodes, so
every path through a design can be more accurately described. For the purposes of graph

Figure 1: Example Graph for a 2-Bit Adder
representation, a path through the design entails a connection from a primary input port to a
primary output port that may pass through intermediary internal signals. In addition to helping
with path description, these elaborated logic paths also improve functionality assignment and
matching since every path through the design is properly represented from the expression of all
signal graphs in the top-level component and all subcomponents. Figure 1 shows an example graph
for a 2-bit adder. In this graph, nibble1 and nibble2 are input signals, sum and carry_out are output
signals, and temp is an internal signal. For this adder, temp is driven by both nibble1 and nibble2
while temp drives both sum and carry_out. In addition to the previous points, graph representation
15

may be leveraged in the future to easily identify certain types of Trojans. For example, it could be
used to identify disconnected nodes which point to unwanted or unused logic. It could also allow
tracking of each signal assigned as a clock asset to identify undesirable actors and prevent them
from affecting clock behavior.
3.3

GOLDEN REFERENCE LIBRARY FILE FORMAT
The Golden Reference Library (GRL) was also reformatted while making improvements

to other algorithms related to the matching process. To structure GRL file entries, new GRL files
are formatted to JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) specifications. Figure 2 details a generalized
layout of the new GRL format. The overall design has a primary and secondary functionality
assigned to it as well as a name, creation time, and format version. Additionally, each component
is assigned a name, primary functionality, and secondary functionality. Components contain parent
component and child component data to determine their positions in the design hierarchy. To save
computation time when a GRL entry is read, components also store a copy of their asset frequency
data to detail the asset types appearing within it and its child components. The final asset data
stored is internal and external asset data for input, output, inout, buffer, linkage, and internal signals.
This accounts for all signal types and increases the total number of characteristics to twelve. To
supplement the aforementioned information, all components and subcomponents are fully
expressed in the GRL file instead of featuring only one instance of each component. Using this
method, different functionalities and asset layouts for components are considered instead of
registering only a single functionality. Since GRL files can be large and will need to be stored
long-term, the new GRL format applies standard compression. The compression for GRL files
uses the built-in Python pickle library to create a binary object dump of the entry_data portion of
the GRL file. Next, the binary dump is compressed using the LZMA algorithm and encoded to the
16

A85 format to realize size benefits when encoding binary data. Lastly, the data is decoded to UTF8 to maintain file readability and avoid writing binary blobs directly in line with JSON text.
{
"format_version": ...,
"design_info": {
"name": ...,
"primary_functionality": ...,
"secondary_functionality": ..., "creation_time": ...
},
"entry_data": {
"components": [
{
"name": ...,
"primary_functionality": ..., "secondary_functionality": ...,
"parent_component": ..., "child_components": [...],
"asset_frequency_data": {...},
"input_signal_asset_data": {...}, "output_signal_asset_data": {...},
"buffer_signal_asset_data": {...}, "linkage_signal_asset_data": {...},
"inout_signal_asset_data": {...}, "internal_signal_asset_data": {...}
},
...
]
}
}

Figure 2. Example Golden Reference Library entry
Because only the entry_data portion of the GRL JSON is compressed, it is possible to view
the overall design summary without decompressing the file. In the case of the GRL file for the
f32c processor, the GRL file size was decreased from approximately 1.28 megabytes to 15
kilobytes for a total decrease in size of approximately 98%. This will allow for more GRL entries
without taking up significantly more disk space. Overall, these changes produce GRL files that
contain more information while improving accuracy and readability.
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3.4

REORGANIZING FUNCTIONALITIES
To begin matching improvements, the list of functionalities was elaborated upon and

expanded into a set that is more representative of the functionalities that designs may implement.
The prior functionality system organized functionalities into a whitelist and blacklist. Whitelist
functionalities are those without Trojan behavior while blacklist functionalities do exhibit Trojan
behavior. This functional organization is provided below in Table 2.
Table 2. Whitelist and Blacklist Functionalities [10]
Whitelist Functionality
SHIFT_REGISTER
INTERRUPT_UNIT
COMMUNICATION
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
COMPUTATIONAL
TIMING
CONTROL_GENERATION
REGISTER_FILE
PERIPHERAL
DECODER_ENCODER
DEBUG_INTERFACE

Blacklist Functionality
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
TROJAN_TRIGGER
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER

To revise these functionalities, it is necessary to ensure each functionality describes a
category of IP at a similar level of granularity, so no functionality is more heavily weighted than
others. Additionally, chosen functionalities must accurately describe any IP. The new system of
functionalities is below in Table 3.
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Table 3. Updated Functionalities
Functionality
unassigned
cannot_determine
processor
hardware_accelerator
memory
datapath
power_management
clock_generation
timing
pwm
cryptography
computational
control_unit
debugging
port
communication
decoder_encoder
library
peripheral

Has Trojan Equivalent
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

While the updated functionalities no longer categorize blacklist and whitelist functionalities,
each functionality now has a Trojan equivalent of itself to precisely express what kind of
functionality the design shows and whether it exhibits malicious behavior. Furthermore, the larger
number of functionalities helps prevent categories from being too broad in scope, and they more
accurately identify and distinguish designs. The unassigned functionality is the default
functionality used when no other functionality has been assigned. The cannot_determine
functionality’s Trojan and clean variants are used when a currently defined functionality does not
fit, but it is known whether or not the design contains a Trojan. Any processor functionality
components perform operations on an external data source, usually facilitated by an instruction set.
Components designated as hardware_accelerator aid or optimize some other computation. The
memory functionality describes components that store information for immediate or later use. Any
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components that perform data processing operations or control data flow throughout a design are
described by the datapath functionality. Components labeled as power_management affect power
distribution. In the clock_generation functionality are components that create or drive the clock
signal for distribution throughout a design while the timing functionality applies to components
that configure or process the clock signal generated by a clock_generation component and perform
other timing-related actions. Components that modulate an electrical signal to reduce its average
power belong to the pwm functionality. The cryptography functionality encompasses
cryptographic functions or cryptographic operations performed by components, and the
computational functionality details components that implement arithmetic functions or perform
arithmetic operations. Components that manage the operation of other components or devices fall
into the control_unit functionality. The debugging functionality describes components that output
debugging information and perform exception handling and detection. Functionalities that fall into
port are components that act as a physical interface to another device. The functionalities related
to communication are components that facilitate the transfer of data over wired or wireless
connections either internally or externally. Any component that decodes or encodes information
can be described by the decoder_encoder functionality. The library functionality applies to
packages or libraries from which components or signals are loaded and cannot be expressed as a
physical part of an IP despite its presence in RTL code.
3.5

GOLDEN REFERENCE MATCHING
While some stages of matching remain unchanged, others have been removed due to

deprecation. Those remaining stages have been overhauled and optimized in various ways. The
stages remaining from the initial Golden Reference Matching process are the Statistical Matching
Step, the Champion Golden Reference Library Matching Step, and the Functionality Golden
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Reference Library Matching Step. The overall matching process has been reorganized to remove
extraneous prior work and streamline added matching optimizations.
3.5.1 Champion Golden Reference Library Matching
The Champion Golden Reference Library portion of the matching process, introduced in
[10], determines the initial assigned functionality of an unknown soft IP. In addition to the
declaration of an unknown soft IP’s functionality, this GRL only contains one design per
functionality, allowing it to use less resources. The Champion GRL entries are a subset of the
Functionality GRL entries and are manually selected so each entry in the Champion GRL is the
best representative of the related functionality. The efficacy of the Champion GRL is further
increased due to the various functionality changes implemented to more effectively describe and
categorize designs. If a Champion GRL entry contains too few asset sets or too few unique assets,
then bias is introduced due to the reassignment of general assets to specific assets. Designs
containing many asset sets with many uniquely identifying assets may also exhibit bias when the
soft IP contains fewer unique assets than a given Champion GRL entry. Addressed previously in
this section, the process of selecting a Champion GRL entry to represent a functionality must
consider asset sets and all uniquely identifying assets within the entry before being evaluated and
added to the Champion GRL. This process is critical to avoid the biases highlighted above and to
ensure the initial functionality match is as accurate as possible.
3.5.1.1 Coarse-Grained Asset Reassignment
The coarse-grained asset reassignment approach, retaining its original usage described in
[10], is utilized due to the entry limitations of the Champion GRL. The comparisons between an
unknown soft IP and the Champion GRL are fine-grained. This leads to top Champion GRL
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matches having a lower overall matching percentage against the unknown soft IP when compared
to matches of the soft IP against designs of similar or the same functionality. Because of this, the
Champion GRL matching process is performed in conjunction with coarse-grained asset
reassignment utilized exclusively on external characteristics.
3.5.1.2 Asset Set One
Asset Set One has increased from ten generalized external asset categories to eleven. All
external assets are encompassed by these categories. Table 4 shows all categories in Asset Set One
and the assets which map to Asset Set One categories.
Table 4. Reworked Asset Set One
Category
Data._any
Data.communication
Data.encryption
Data.address
Timing.system_timing
Timing.status

InstructionSet.instruction

Assets
Data: computational, sensitive, critical, test_in,
test_out
Data.peripheral
Data: decryption, _hash, encoding, decoding,
key
Data.memory
Timing: clock, subsystem_clock,
subsystem_timing, test_clock
Timing: ready, done, busy, hold, count, wait,
standby
SpecificSystemControl.communication_status
SystemControl: enable, _set, reset, execute,
read, write, select, load, shift, interrupt, mode,
acknowledge, handshaking, dataflow, flag,
request, test_mode_select, test_reset
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Table 4. Reworked Asset Set One (Cont.)
Category

SpecificSystemControl.peripheral_control

SpecificSystemControl.exception_handling
Parameter.configuration
MiscellaneousAsset.unused

Assets
Timing: clock_control,
subsystem_clock_control
SpecificSystemControl: interrupt_control,
memory_control, communication_control,
communication_protocol, bus_control,
duty_cycle, phase
InstructionSet: operand, operation_type, source,
destination, program_counter, branch, offset,
program_counter_op, data_op, memory_op,
interrupt_op, priority, availability,
pipeline_clear, pipeline_lock
SpecificSystemControl.error_handling
Parameter: initialization, frequency, timing,
phase, data_width, generate_control, enable
MiscellaneousAsset: component, unknown

Many of these assets either map to new asset categories or are newly created external assets
entirely. These changes help improve the descriptive capabilities for each reassigned category,
thereby improving the efficiency of Asset Set One. This stage of reassignment is employed on both
the unknown soft IP and the Champion GRL entries, so the assets and functionality yield the
highest possible percent match.
3.5.1.3 Asset Set Two
Asset Set Two has also increased from ten general categories to eleven. Typical of GRL
entries, broader assets become much more common across designs than other assets with higher
specificity. Because data assets are particularly common due to most IP processing data in some
way, the primary focus of Asset Set Two is to classify data assets into a new category. Table 5
describes the asset categories and assets of Asset Set Two. In contrast to Asset Set One, some
categories in Asset Set Two may not have any assets mapped to them. This is due to Asset Set Two
primarily handling data assets, important distinguishing factors in many designs. As such, some
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assets remain without necessitating reassignment since they are uncommon enough to aptly
express design characteristics.
Table 5. Reworked Asset Set Two
Category
Data._any
Data.memory
Data.communication
Data.peripheral
Data.encryption
Data.address
Data.sensitive
Timing.system_timing

Assets
Data.computational

Data: decryption, _hash, encoding, decoding, key
Data.critical
Timing: clock, subsystem_clock, subsystem_timing, status,
ready, done, busy, hold, count, wait, standby, test_clock
SpecificSystemControl.communication_status

InstructionSet.instruction

Parameter.configuration
MiscellaneousAsset.unused

Timing: clock_control, subsystem_clock_control
SystemControl: enable, _set, reset, execute, read, write, select,
load, shift, interrupt, mode, acknowledge, handshaking,
dataflow, flag, request, test_mode_select, test_reset
SpecificSystemControl: interrupt_control, peripheral_control,
memory_control, communication_control,
communication_protocol, bus_control, duty_cycle, phase,
exception_handling, error_handling
InstructionSet: operand, operation_type, source, destination,
program_counter, branch, offset, program_counter_op,
data_op, memory_op, interrupt_op, priority, availability,
pipeline_clear, pipeline_lock
Parameter: initialization, frequency, timing, phase, data_width,
generate_control, enable
Data: test_in, test_out
MiscellaneousAsset: component, unknown

Top matching percentages determine when to employ Asset Set Two. If a certain threshold
is met, then functionality matching can continue with only the usage of Asset Set One. After some
unknown soft IP has completed the asset reassignment process and these reassigned assets have
been propagated through the IP, the matching process will perform the reassignments detailed in
Asset Set One. Once the matching process completes and the soft IP matches to the Champion
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GRL entries, the top two matches yielded are compared with a configurable matching threshold.
The default configuration value of the matching threshold is 40% and was determined from initial
testing in [10]; however, this value may be altered to achieve better results in certain scenarios.
Any designs with less than a 40% match are low confidence functionality assignments. If the first
match exceeds 40%, then it is necessary to compare with the second highest matching functionality.
Table 6. Functionality Threshold Example
Functionality
computational
datapath

Match Percentage
90%
85%

If an unknown soft IP has matching percentages below this threshold, the confidence in
any match is not high enough to justify a functionality assignment. In addition to this first threshold,
a second configurable threshold is used. The significance of the second threshold is to signify
functionality differences due to design variability within each functionality category, and the
default value for this threshold is 15%. If the top two matches have a difference exceeding 15%,
then the unknown soft IP is considered part of the top matches’ functionalities and moves forward
to match against the Functionality Golden Reference Library. In Table 6, the matches for
computational and datapath do not have a difference of greater than 15% and are determined to
not be sufficient in deciding the component’s functionality.
3.5.2 Functionality Golden Reference Library Matching
Also originating in [10], the Functionality Golden Reference Library Matching (FGRLM)
process complements the Champion GRL matching process. As outlined in the original GRL
matching process, a design would be matched against all entries within the GRL, which scales
poorly as the number of GRL entries increases. To reduce this computational overhead, FGRLM
is employed after the Champion GRL matching process is completed. After an unknown IP has its
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initial functionality decided, it is then matched against the FGRLM associated with that
functionality. By doing this, any unknown soft IP will only be matched against Champion GRL
and GRL entries pertaining to the FGRLM-determined functionality rather than being matched
against all GRL entries. This approach has the additional benefit of increasing matching
percentages because an unknown soft IP is only compared against designs similar in functionality.
3.5.2.1 Fine-Grained Asset Reassignment
To supplement the coarse-grain reassignment sets iterated previously, a fine-grained
reassignment strategy, originally reported in [10], is also utilized. Fine-grained reassignment
increases the matching percentage between an unknown soft IP and the Functionality GRL entries.
In the case of asset reassignment, only the assets of Functionality GRL entries undergo
reassignment. Table 7 shows all categories in Asset Set Three and their respective assets. Unknown
soft IPs will generally have the most recently available assets assigned to them while entries within
the Functionality GRL may not contain up-to-date asset assignments, causing biases that could
negatively impact matching results. This negative effect is addressed by this reassignment strategy.
Because this reassignment strategy is fine-grained, many assets are not reassigned to a particular
category and remain as they are.
Table 7. Reworked Asset Set Three
Category
Data._any
Data.memory
Data.communication
Data.peripheral
Data.encryption
Data.encoding
Data.address
Data.sensitive

Assets
Data.computational

Data: decryption, _hash, key
Data.decoding
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Table 7. Reworked Asset Set Three (Cont.)
Category
Data.critical
Timing.clock
Timing.clock_control
Timing.system_timing
Timing.status
Timing.busy
Timing.count
SystemControl._set
SystemControl.reset
SystemControl.execute
SystemControl.read
SystemControl.select
SystemControl.shift
SystemControl.interrupt
SystemControl.mode
SystemControl.acknowledge
SystemControl.handshaking
SystemControl.dataflow
SystemControl.flag
SystemControl.request
SystemControl.test_mode_select

Assets
Timing.subsystem_clock
Timing.subsystem_clock_control
Timing.subsystem_timing
Timing: ready, done, hold
Timing: wait, standby

SystemControl: write, load
SystemControl.enable

Data: test_in, test_out
Timing.test_clock,
SystemControl.test_reset

SpecificSystemControl.peripheral_control
SpecificSystemControl.communication_control
SpecificSystemControl.bus_control
SpecificSystemControl.duty_cycle
SpecificSystemControl.exception_handling
InstructionSet.instruction
InstructionSet.operand
InstructionSet.operation_type
InstructionSet.source
InstructionSet.program_counter
InstructionSet.memory_op

SpecificSystemControl:
communication_protocol,
communication_status
SpecificSystemControl.phase
SpecificSystemControl.error_handling

InstructionSet.data_op
InstructionSet: destination, branch, offset
InstructionSet.program_counter_op
SpecificSystemControl.memory_control
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Table 7. Reworked Asset Set Three (Cont.)
Category
InstructionSet.interrupt_op
InstructionSet.priority
InstructionSet.availability
InstructionSet.pipeline_clear
Parameter.configuration
Parameter.frequency
Parameter.timing
Parameter.data_width
Parameter.generate_control
Parameter.enable
MiscellaneousAsset.component
MiscellaneousAsset.unknown
MiscellaneousAsset.unused

Assets
SpecificSystemControl.interrupt_control

InstructionSet.pipeline_lock
Parameter.initialization
Parameter.phase

It is necessary to establish a metric for assets needing reassignment. The process of using
asset reassignment strategies can be seen in Figure 3. For this metric, the same characteristic from
both the Functionality GRL and unknown IP is used. First, only asset sets belonging to one
characteristic are considered, and those characteristics must have external assets. Internal assets
are disregarded because a significant portion of them are automatically assigned

Figure 3: Reassignment Process Overview
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during the parsing phase of the process. Next, all Functionality GRL entries are iterated over,
receiving asset sets from the same characteristic as the unknown soft IP. These assets from the
Functionality GRL are compared against the unknown IP’s assets, and only the Functionality GRL
entry’s assets are reassigned because the unknown IP features up-to-date asset assignments.
Therefore, only asset sets within the same characteristic are reassigned. In the event both designs
have a similar and more applicable asset, frequency analysis is employed to determine whether the
original or similar assets are the better fit.
3.5.3 Statistical Matching
Statistical matching techniques from [10] are employed to calculate the matching
percentages used in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. However, these techniques have been modified, and
their usages are different. In general, within the overall percentage match calculation, a new
approach of dynamic weighting is employed.

𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 % 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ =

∑𝑁
𝑖=𝐴 % 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖
𝑁

Equation 2: Percent Match Equation with Dynamic Weighting
To implement this dynamic weighting, Equation 2 is used. In this equation, the
characteristics used are denoted from 𝐴 to 𝑁. For the dynamic weighting approach, a characteristic
is ignored to increase matching percentage if neither design has the characteristic. This ensures the
yielded matching percentage is always on a 100% scale rather than being artificially lowered if
characteristics are not present. Determining weight for each characteristic leverages the same
calculation used in [10] and is seen in Equation 3.
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𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) =

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
𝑛

Equation 3: Asset Probability Calculation from [10]
Equation 3 is used to determine the weight of any characteristics relevant to dynamic
weighting. In this case, 𝑛 is the number of GRL entries, and the summation is incremented by 1
for each GRL entry that contains the asset. This sum is then divided by the number of GRL entries
to yield the probability of a GRL entry contains the asset. After calculating the probability of each
asset, the weights of relevant assets are calculated.
𝑊𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)
Equation 4: Asset Weight Calculation from [10]
The weight of an asset is determined by the probability that it will not be contained in a
GRL entry and its calculation can be seen in Equation 4. An uncommon asset will have a high
weight because it is more uniquely identifying while a common asset will have a low weight since
many GRL entries have it, making the common asset a less unique identifier. After the calculation
of asset weights and probabilities, it is possible to leverage the results of these calculations to
determine average asset weight.

𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑊𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 =

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖
𝑁

Equation 5: Average Asset Weight Calculation from [10]
In Equation 5, the average weight of a particular asset is equal to the sum of all asset
weights in a matched characteristic, and this sum is divided by 𝑁, the total number of matched
assets. If an asset has a higher weight than other assets, it is less common in the GRL and more
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identifying than other assets, making high-weight assets more important for matching purposes.
These results are used to calculate the final characteristic weight in Equation 6.

𝑊𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 =

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑊𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
∗ 100
∑𝑁
𝑖=𝐴 𝑖𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑊𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡

Equation 6: Characteristic Weight Calculation from [10]
For this equation, the weight of a characteristic is equal to the average asset weight of
characteristic 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 divided by the summation of the average asset weight of all characteristics. In
this case, 𝑖 iterates through the dynamically-weighted characteristics relevant to the entries from
𝐴 to 𝑁. Additionally, this quotient is multiplied by 100 to convert it into a percent contribution of
each 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 to the total average asset weight from all dynamically weighted characteristics. To
optimize the efficiency of Equations 3, 4, 5, and 6, asset frequency data is precalculated and stored
with each GRL entry. This can be seen in the asset_frequency_data key in the GRL format
example in Figure 2. By doing the calculation in advance, it is no longer necessary to determine
asset probabilities and weights for all GRL entries in an iterative manner.
3.5.4 Revised Matching Process
The combination of Champion GRL Matching, FGRLM, and Statistical Matching as the
overall matching process has been revised to allow for improved matching. After selecting a GRL
entry to match against, the first step in calculating a design match is to find all unkonwn asset sets
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with a 100% match to GRL asset sets within a given characteristic and add them to the final match
data. Match data is represented as a dictionary where the first-level mapping is each asset

Figure 4. Asset Set Matching Overview
characteristic. Within each characteristic, another level of the dictionary relates a signal’s name to
its best GRL match along with the number of sets from that match. Here, the number of sets refers
to the bit-width of the signal such that there is one instance of a given asset set for each bit of a
signal. All bit-level calculations are done at the parsing stage. After removing all 100% match data,
a check is performed to see if all asset sets have been matched between the two designs. If match
data remains, then best-fit matching is performed on the remaining asset sets. This is done by
iterating through all unmatched GRL asset sets within the same characteristic. Each GRL asset set
is matched against all unknown asset sets within the same characteristic, with its best match being
initialized to the highest-matching unknown characteristic. After setting this match, all other GRL
asset sets are checked to ensure the unknown asset set does not match more highly than the current
best match. In the event that another GRL asset set matches better to the unknown asset set in
question, then the current GRL asset set has its best match changed to the next highest match and
the verification process starts again. If a GRL asset set has the same percentage match as the current
best match, the number of asset sets is checked and the match that is closer to this number is chosen
instead. In the event that all unknown asset sets have a higher match with other GRL asset sets,
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the GRL asset set is temporarily skipped. Finally, once a best match is found, it is added to the
best match data and removed from the matched assets sets. Then, the remaining unmatched data
is updated, and this process is continued for the next GRL asset set. This process of removing
matches from unmatched data is detailed in Figure 4. Any characteristic containing asset sets in
one design but not in the other is given a 0% match and added to the final match data.
Throughought the entire process, characteristic matching data is cached to avoid unnecessary
recalculations and to maintain match data after each asset set match is performed.
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4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

When comparing the original and new matching processes, it is important to highlight the
differences in matching functionalities as well as GRL differences addressed in Section 3.3.
Notably, the updated GRL is significantly larger and includes bias towards clean designs. Both
Functionality GRLs do not contain an even distribution of entries across all functionalities and
may lead to discrepancies with functionalities such as clock_generation having no entries at the
time of testing. These issues and others are explained in the following subsections. All
functionalities provided in the following tables regarding the new matching process are clean,
Trojan-free functionalities unless otherwise specified. The matching percentage data shown for
each matching process is calculated from different metrics and is not directly comparable.
4.1

BUS INTERFACE
The bus interface design is composed of a microcontroller containing ROM, SPRAM, LED

outputs, and a UART communication module. This is a significantly large design and includes
several hundred component instances. External assets are assigned to the primary port signals of
each component as well as the top Bus_Interface_Top module. In the original matching process, it
was not possible for asset filtering to fully define signals to subcomponents because each unique
subcomponent was expressed as a single instance instead of multiple. For instance, if there were
100 instantiations of an SPRAM module, it only considered one of them. The asset filtering step
has been improved in the new matching process because the filtering is fully expressed throughout
all subcomponents and their instances, thereby offering improved results. The percentages in Table
8 below differ from the baseline results in [10] because a newer bus interface design was utilized.
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Table 8. Bus Interface Matching Results

Component
Bus_Interface_Top
osch
PLL_Clk
vlo
ehxpllj
Bus_Master
SPRAM
inv
rom16x1a
vhi
fd1p3dx
mux321
spr16x4c
RS232_Usr_Int
STD_FIFO
Bus_Int
Std_Counter
LED_Ctrl
PWM_16b

Original Matching Process
Functionality
Match
COMMUNICATION
15.0%
COMPUTATIONAL
28.0%
COMPUTATIONAL
12.0%
COMPUTATIONAL
54.0%
COMPUTATIONAL
24.0%
COMMUNICATION
44.0%
COMMUNICATION
39.0%
COMMUNICATION
13.0%
COMMUNICATION
13.0%
COMMUNICATION
9.0%
COMMUNICATION
27.0%
COMMUNICATION
20.0%
COMMUNICATION
32.0%
COMMUNICATION
44.0%
COMMUNICATION
41.0%
COMMUNICATION
41.0%
COMMUNICATION
29.0%
COMMUNICATION
35.0%
COMMUNICATION
33.0%

New Matching Process
Functionality
Match
control_unit
8.4%
computational
11.3%
datapath
8.3%
computational
12.5%
control_unit
19.4%
memory
16.7%
memory
19.9%
memory
19.9%
memory
40.6%
memory
4.0%
memory
30.3%
datapath
19.1%
memory
18.6%
communication
12.2%
memory
27.9%
datapath
24.2%
datapath
23.3%
datapath
10.9%
debugging
14.7%

Regarding the original matching process results, almost all components are categorized as
COMMUNICATION. This can be attributed to asset filtering adding many assets to each signal in
large designs, making classification more difficult with the increased volume of information.
However, the new matching process fully expresses all subcomponents. In the case of Bus_Master,
there are several hundred memory-related components which leads to most functionalities being
expressed as memory despite not necessarily being memory. The full expression of all
subcomponents has caused memory asset saturation due to the number of memory modules utilized
in the bus interface design. This will need to be addressed in the future but shows improvements
in the representation of designs in the new matching process. Additionally, a larger number of
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functionalities are shown during matching instead of having an abnormally high number of
COMMUNICATION functionalities assigned.
4.2

PS/2 KEYBOARD CONTROLLER
The PS/2 Keyboard Controller is IP consisting of a top-level Ps2_keyboard component and

two lower-level debounce components, and it facilitates communication between a computer and
a user’s keyboard. The results of the old and new matching processes on the unknown PS/2
Keyboard Controller IP are presented in Table 9. This data is slightly different than the baseline
data in [10] because previous data does not contain matching percentages for the debounce
subcomponent.
Table 9. PS/2 Keyboard Controller Matching Results
Component
Ps2_keyboard
debounce

Original Matching Process
Functionality
Match
PERIPHERAL
100.0%
COMMUNICATION
63.0%

New Matching Process
Functionality
Match
control_unit
21.7%
communication
9.5%

Above, Ps2_keyboard was labeled PERPHERAL functionality by the original matching
process and control_unit functionality by the new matching process. Of these two, control_unit is
more indicative of the true functionality of the PS/2 Keyboard Controller. Both matching processes
assign communication functionality to the debounce component; however, it would be more
properly identified by the peripheral functionality. This discrepancy is caused by a lack of
peripheral functionality components in both the former and updated GRLs.
4.3

LCD16×2 DISPLAY CONTROLLER
The LCD16×2 Display Controller is a single component consisting of a large vector input

for each line of the two-line LCD displays used on some Xilinx evaluation boards. It features two
128-bit vector inputs where data inputs correspond to one of the two lines of the LCD display. The
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matching results for an unknown LCD16×2 Display Controller are shown in Table 10. For this
example, the resulting functionality match for the new and original matching processes are similar.
Table 10. LCD16×2 Display Controller Matching Results
Component
lcd16x2

Original Matching Process
Functionality
Match
PERIPHERAL
75.0%

New Matching Process
Functionality Match
peripheral
20.2%

The original matching process assigns a PERIPHERAL functionality with a 75% match
while the new matching process also assigns a peripheral functionality but with a smaller 20.2%
match. Since both matching processes arrive at the proper functionality, both are correct for this
design. However, the new matching process yields a smaller percent match due to the total match
being distributed across several subcomponents.
4.4

BASIC RSA-T200
The Basic RSA-T200 design is a smaller design consisting of a denial-of-service Trojan in

the RSACypher component. This Trojan disables encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the
receiver. In Table 11 below, the results from identifying the functionalities of the unknown Basic
RSA-T200 IP are exhibited for the new matching process alongside data from [10] for comparison.
Table 11. Basic RSA-T200
Component
RSACypher
Modmult

Data From [10]
Functionality
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
COMPUTATIONAL

Match
83.2%
100.0%

New Matching Process
Functionality
Match
communication
17.0%
computational
18.6%

The original matching process assigned TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT to RSACypher
and COMPUTATIONAL to Modmult. The new matching process assigns communication to
RSACypher and computational to Modmult. An explanation for the discrepancy in RSACypher
identification is the limited number of Trojan designs in the Functionality GRL which leads to a
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lack of similar designs for matching. For Modmult, both matching processes arrive at equivalent
functionalities, but the new matching process has a reduced match percentage due to
subcomponent matching.
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5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Rebuilding the codebase of the Structural Checking Tool and standardizing several aspects
of the matching and parsing processes have resulted in a more organized tool which allows for
streamlined development and increased matching accuracy. The matching and parsing processes
are more lightweight and optimized, focusing on current statistical analysis and Champion and
Functionality GRL Matching. Additionally, the user experience of the Structural Checking Tool
has been improved, and the time required to prepare HDL code for parsing within the tool has been
significantly reduced. Issues pertaining to parseable VHDL syntax have also been addressed,
allowing more designs to be usable out-of-the-box without necessitating changes. These
improvements should allow the Functionality GRL to grow at a faster rate which will improve
matching as a result.
While the new structure of the tool is more modular and easier to expand, there are still
many opportunities for improvement. The size of the Functionality GRL will always need to
increase, and there is an ongoing effort to find the most representative designs for each
functionality to use in the Champion GRL. However, the matching processes will need further
optimization to improve execution performance as GRL size increases. Additionally, there is room
to expand the parsing functionality to encompass other HDL languages and to more accurately
express the structure of designs with improved syntax coverage.
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